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15.1 Introduction
What role does market competition play in the United States’ health care system,
and what might the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) learn from
each other’s experiences? Market competition remains a persistent but elusive ideal
in American health care. More than its peers, the US health care system looks to
market-inspired theories and policy instruments to solve its problems. But decades
of policies promoting this ideal have not given Americans the health system they
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desire.1 Most recognize that equity is not what markets provide,2 yet markets have
also failed to produce a more efficient US health care system. Ironically, the ideal of
market competition has both driven and undermined contemporary health reform
efforts in the United States. Even reforms designed to stimulate more competitive
markets have faced considerable resistance because the political branches could not
agree how to balance the public and private sectors.3
Markets versus government remains the ‘basic dividing line and dominant
theme in American health policy’.4 Academics and policymakers have long
struggled to identify the appropriate role for markets in health care.5 And there
remains ‘deep social ambivalence about whether health care should be considered
a public good or a commodity’.6
Of course, the United States is not alone in this struggle. Because there has
never been a purely public or private health care system,7 every country must
determine the appropriate relationship between markets and government in health
care. Even countries with robust public health care systems are trying to use
markets to squeeze more efficiency out of their systems without jeopardizing other
priorities, such as universal coverage or solidarity. For example, Canada recently
considered whether to open its public system to more private sector participation.8
Most countries labor to find the appropriate role for market competition in health
care.
This chapter explores how the ideal of market competition both drives US
health policy and sets it apart. I begin by reviewing how the US health system
remains an international outlier, examining so-called ‘American exceptionalism’
in health care. Second, I discuss how several EU Member States have embraced
market instruments, and explain how these efforts qualitatively differ from US
efforts. Third, I evaluate notable market-based trends in the United States, such as
managed competition, privatization, and consumer-driven health care, and
describe how these models have failed to live up to their promises. Fourth, this
chapter discusses how contemporary health reform in the United States has been
both driven and undermined by market ideals. I conclude by considering the
appropriate role for competition in health care, given its many limitations.
1 White (2007), pp. 395, 434.
2 Pauly (1998). On the whole, US economists seem less comfortable than economists in Europe
talking about justice and equity in health care. Callahan and Wasunna (2006), p. 10.
3 Cutler and Keenan (2008), p. 472.
4 White (2007), at pp. 395, 396; Hyman (2006), p. 265. Of course, the ‘market’ and ‘market
mechanisms’ can mean many things, including different instruments that bear on the behavior of
different health care actors and institutions. See Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at p. 4.
5 For a particularly insightful analysis nearly thirty years ago, see Rosenblatt (1981), p. 1067.
6 Hunter (2008), p. 20.
7 Chernichovsky (1995), p. 340; Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at pp. 41, 92.
8 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.); Bobinski (2008),
pp. 355–369; Flood, et al. (2005), pp. 257–277.
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15.2 American Exceptionalism in Health Care
The US health care system is exceptional. So-called ‘American exceptionalism’,
the idea that the United States is unique in the world, has been controversial since
Alexis de Tocqueville published his observations in the 1830s.9 But the health
policy world generally agrees that the US health care system is singular.10 Among
developed countries, the United States is the only one without a single health care
system organized around ‘a common philosophy about coverage, access, and
cost’.11 Ours is a fragmented pastiche of health insurers, providers, and facilities,
each of which is regulated primarily by states rather than the federal government.12
Indeed, calling ours a ‘system’ is charitable; its defining feature may be its extreme
decentralization.13
So precisely how is the US health care system exceptional? Health care systems
are generally evaluated along three dimensions: cost, quality, and access.14 As one
scholar notes, ‘enhancing quality, lowering cost, and broadening access’ is the
‘holy grail’ or ‘holy trinity’ of health care policy.15 Compared to its peers, the US
health care system does not fare particularly well along any of these three
dimensions.
The first and increasingly central criterion is cost. How expensive is the health
care system? What does it spend per capita, and what percentage of the economy
does health spending occupy? The US health care system is by far the most
expensive in the world, both in aggregate and per capita terms. In aggregate terms,
the United States spends as much on health care as every other nation in the world
combined. In 2007, worldwide health care spending reached around $4.1 trillion,
and the United States alone accounted for over half of that amount ($2.3 trillion).16
Moreover, most predict that US spending will continue to rise, potentially to as
much $4.3 trillion by 2018—equal to total worldwide health spending today.17
Unsurprisingly, the United States spends a much larger portion of its gross domestic
9 See, e.g., Schuck and Wilson (2008), p. x.
10 ‘Volumes have been written on the topic of American exceptionalism in health policy’. Jost
(2004), p. 437.
11 Cutler and Keenan (2008), at p. 449.
12 Bloche (2009), pp. 452–454. Of course, the same might be said about the EU, as health care
remains a competency of the Member States.
13 Brown (2008), p. 325; Cutler and Keenan (2008), at p. 451.
14 Cortez (2008), p. 95.
15 Hyman and Silver (2001), p. 1452.
16 World Health Organization (2007); Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of the
Actuary, National Health Statistics Group, National Health Expenditures Aggregate, Per Capita
Amounts, Percent Distribution, and Average Annual Percent Growth, by Source of Funds:
Selected Calendar Years 1960–2008 (2008), at Table 1.
17 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary, National Health Statistics
Group, National Health Expenditures and Selected Economic Indicators, Levels and Annual
Percentage Change: Calendar Years 2003–2018 (2008), at Table 1.
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product (GDP) on health care than other countries. In 2008, health care spending
accounted for 16.2% of the US economy, and experts predict it could reach 20.4%
by 2018.18 By contrast, health spending occupies significant but much more modest
portions of the economies in Germany (10.6% of its GDP), Canada (10.1%), the
Netherlands (9.8%), Denmark (9.8%), Spain (8.5%), and the United Kingdom
(8.4%).19 Moreover, US health care is exceptionally expensive in per capita terms.
In 2007, US residents spent an average of $7,290 on health care, roughly twice what
their counterparts spent in Canada ($3,895), Germany ($3,588), the Netherlands
($3,837), Denmark ($3,512), the United Kingdom ($2,992), and Spain ($2,671).20
Again, experts largely project US spending to rise,21 though other countries cer-
tainly also struggle with rising costs.
The second criterion for evaluating health systems is quality. Does the health
care system provide necessary, appropriate, and high quality care? Does it ensure
that health care professionals, facilities, and products meet minimum quality
standards? What results does the system generate, and how healthy are residents?
The US system does not provide high quality care commensurate with its
spending. Although the ‘quality’ of health care is notoriously difficult to measure,
most metrics show that the United States lags behind its peers. For example, in
2000 the World Health Organization (WHO) famously and somewhat controver-
sially ranked 193 countries by the quality and performance of their health sys-
tems.22 The United States ranked 37th in overall performance23 and 24th in the
overall health of its population.24 More specific comparisons show that the United
States does not score well compared to other developed countries on several
health-related metrics, such as life expectancy and infant mortality rates, which are
admittedly imperfect barometers of quality.25 Yet, virtually every comparison of
18 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, supra n. 16, at Table 1; Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, supra n. 17, at Table 1.
19 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Health Data 2009:
Statistics and Indicators for 30 Countries (2009) (citing 2007 data).
20 Ibid.
21 The potential causes for high health care spending in the United States are many, and are
beyond the scope of this chapter. For excellent discussions, see Jost (2007), pp. 174–177, and
Cutler and Keenan (2008), at pp. 450–454.
22 WHO (2000).
23 Ibid., at p. 155. The WHO measured ‘performance’ through eight criteria, including how
responsive and fair the health system is, how healthy residents are, and health spending per
capita. Commentators from the United States often criticize these criteria as being unfairly
weighted against the US health care system.
24 Ibid. at p. 176. The WHO measured ‘health attainment’ by comparing disability-adjusted life
expectancy (DALE) years between countries.
25 Cutler and Keenan (2008), at p. 452, 453 (noting that the United States ranked 23rd out of 30
countries measured in life expectancy at birth).
362 N. Cortez
‘quality’ shines an unfavorable light on the US health care system.26 The US
system does certain things very well. It is good at providing innovative, extraor-
dinary, life-saving treatments. But it struggles to provide basic care and prevent
common illnesses.27 As two notable scholars conclude, ‘there is precious little
evidence that the United States does better than other countries in any material
outcome’.28
The third criterion is access to care. How difficult is it for people of ordinary
means to access health care goods and services? What percentage of the public has
health insurance, and what percentage can obtain basic care? How long must
patients wait for care? Does the system make care reasonably available to those
who need it? Again, despite ample spending, access to health care in the United
States is exceptionally erratic. In 2008, 46.3 million people lacked health insurance
in the United States,29 and undoubtedly more have lost insurance during the recent
recession. Another 25 million Americans are ‘underinsured’, defined as those with
insurance that requires relatively high cost-sharing obligations (such as premiums,
deductibles, and other out-of-pocket spending) relative to income.30 Although some
argue that the uninsured can always get care somewhere, the uninsured do face
consequences—in 2002 the Institute of Medicine estimated that 18,000 adults aged
25–64 die each year from treatable conditions because they lack insurance.31 The
United States is the only modern industrialized democracy that relies primarily on
private, voluntary health insurance32; every other such country approximates uni-
versal coverage.33 United States’ residents who are not offered or cannot afford
health insurance typically go uninsured. Although it is true that the uninsured do not
lack access to all necessary care,34 they must rely on an unorganized patchwork of
‘safety net’ providers with precarious funding.35 Moreover, there are significant
disparities in access to care and the quality of care received depending on one’s
race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.36 Even among the insured, there is
26 See, e.g., Hussey et al. (2003), pp. 89–99 (comparing the US health care system to four others
using 19 quality criteria, such as survival rates from common procedures); American College of
Physicians (2008), pp. 1–21; Docteur and Berenson (2009); Commonwealth Fund Commission
on a High Performance Health System (2008).
27 Nolte and McKee (2008), p. 58.
28 Cutler and Keenan (2008), at p. 453.
29 DeNavas-Walt et al. (2009), pp. 20, 21 (Table 7).
30 Schoen et al. (2008), p. w298 (web exclusive). Moreover, Families USA (2007) estimated that
during 2006–2007, up to 89.5 million people under age 65 lacked health insurance for at least one
month. Families USA (2007).
31 Institute of Medicine of the National Academies (2002), p. 165.
32 Jost (2004), at p. 433.
33 Jost (2007), at p. 178.
34 Ibid., at p. 2.
35 See Institute of Medicine of the National Academies (2000).
36 American College of Physicians (2008), at p. 2.
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significant variation in health care costs, quality, and access.37 Although no
country’s health care system is completely equitable—wealthier residents tend to
access higher quality care more quickly than non-wealthy residents virtually
everywhere, the United States is alone among developed countries in allocating
health care primarily based on one’s ability to pay.38 For decades, US policymakers
have tried unsuccessfully to approximate universal insurance coverage.
The US health care system is exceptional in countless other ways. It spends
markedly more on administrative costs than any other system.39 Its medical
malpractice compensation system is notorious for being excessive and punitive.40
And it uses ‘one of the most regressive approaches to financing of any country in
the world’.41
In sum, the US health care system is exceptional: exceptionally expensive,
exceptionally inefficient, and exceptionally uneven in distributing care to its
population. As Jost concludes, other countries demonstrate that they can ‘provide
universal access at much lower cost without sacrificing quality’.42 Indeed, the
experience of other countries ‘tends to show that in this one particular corner of the
economy, government often outperforms the private sector’.43 Yet the US health
care system still clings to the ideal that market competition can solve its problems.
15.3 Market Competition in Europe: Proceeding
from a Different Baseline
Despite its exceptional nature, the US health care system is far from the only one
to embrace market competition. Virtually every health care system in the EU relies
on at least some market-based tools and incentives, typically to reduce costs,
enhance efficiency, and give patients greater choice.44 Indeed, health reforms in
37 Ibid., at p. 1.
38 Jost (2007), at p. 178, 182 (noting that in most other countries ‘health care resources are
distributed primarily on the basis of other criteria, though rarely is wealth irrelevant’.).
39 American College of Physicians (2008), at p. 9; Cutler and Keenan (2008), at p. 452; Jost
(2007), at pp. 175–176.
40 Studdert et al. (2004), p. 283; Leflar (2009), p. 3. Note that despite repeated declarations that
the US medical malpractice system significantly contributes to high health care spending, most
studies suggest that it contributes no more than 5% to overall spending, even when factoring in
the costs of defensive medicine (e.g., ordering tests and procedures motivated by the fear of
malpractice liability rather than a judgment that the procedure is medically appropriate or
necessary). Cutler and Keenan (2008), at p. 453; Jost (2007), at p. 175.
41 Jost (2007), at p. 191.
42 Ibid., at p. 188.
43 Ibid., at p. 201.
44 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at p. 90, 92.
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Member States have generally converged around the common trend of introducing
market-based incentives.45
Of course, some Member States embrace market incentives in health care more
than others. For example, Callahan and Wasunna have identified certain States as
‘market rejectors’ (Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom), and others as ‘market accommodators’ (Belgium, Germany, Israel, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland), with others falling in between.46 Market ‘accom-
modators’ generally try to utilize market instruments without sacrificing principles
of solidarity or universal coverage.47 But even the market ‘rejectors’ (States that
historically reject broader, more invasive market mechanisms in health care)
generally ‘accept some limited role for the market’.48
The ‘accommodators’ have embraced market instruments in several ways. Most
notably, the Dutch health care system relies on individual insurance mandates and
competition between private insurers (often referred to as ‘regulated competition’),
building on theories of managed competition developed originally by American
economist Enthoven.49 The Dutch Health Insurance Act, which entered into force
on 1 January 2006, requires private managed care organizations to compete
annually for individual patients, implementing concepts like selective contracting,
using general practitioners as gatekeepers, and vertically integrating with pro-
viders.50 The Dutch system is also notable for the government’s efforts to provide
objective price and quality information to consumers.51 Likewise, reforms in
Germany, with one of the most expensive health care systems in the world, have
tried to encourage competition among both providers and the sickness funds that
pay for them.52 Switzerland, another expensive system, has also encouraged
competition among its insurance funds.53 In fact, the Dutch and Swiss health care
systems both have inspired US reform discussions.54 Thus, although only the
45 Ibid., at p. 91.
46 Ibid., at pp. 91–108.
47 Ibid., at p. 92.
48 Ibid., at p. 91.
49 Ven, van de and Schut (2008), pp. 771, 773–774 (noting that the Netherlands ‘is the first
country that is consistently implementing Alain Enthoven’s model of national health insurance
based on managed competition in the private sector’); Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at pp. 43,
101–103. Enthoven originally presented his views in a 1977 memo to the US Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, subsequently published in two parts in The New England Journal of
Medicine. See Rosenblatt (1981), at p. 1076 n. 34. See also the chapter by Sauter in this book.
50 Ven, van de and Schut (2008). Importantly, the Dutch government finances many of the most
expensive and least affordable health care goods and services, such as long-term nursing care,
hospitalizations over a certain duration, and inpatient mental health care. Jost (2007), at p. 193.
51 Ven, van de and Schut (2008), at p. 780 (noting that the Dutch government established a
website to provide consumers information about insurers, at http://www.kiesbeter.nl).
52 Freeman (1998b), pp. 179–191; Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at pp. 100, 101. See the
chapter by Welti in this book.
53 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at 103, 104.
54 Harris (2007).
15 The Elusive Ideal of Market Competition in United States’ Health Care 365
Dutch system relies primarily on private insurers, other systems in the EU
implement market-inspired policies.
Even the market ‘rejectors’ have experimented with market instruments in
health care. Sweden—with its robust welfare state and general wariness of market
influences in health care—has tried easing cost pressures by (i) encouraging hos-
pitals to compete with one another, (ii) utilizing private providers, and (iii) shifting
costs to patients via co-payments.55 Italy has tried to encourage equal competition
among public and private providers and, like other countries, has tried to use co-
payments to contain costs.56 Denmark, which has one of the most comprehensive
health systems in Europe, increasingly relies on private supplemental insurance.57
Likewise, 80% of the population in France relies on supplemental private health
insurance.58 Even the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS), a well-
known paradigm for public, centralized health care, has implemented market-based
reforms. Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major both encouraged ‘internal competi-
tion’ among NHS hospitals.59 The NHS has also tried to encourage managed
competition by introducing primary care trusts to pay for care.60
Despite these examples, and there are many more, the United States and EU
Member States have implemented market-based tools from very different base-
lines. While the United States is alone among developed countries in relying
primarily on private, voluntary health insurance, Member States generally cover
everyone, usually through national or social health insurance.61 Historically, the
arguments for more competition in European health care systems ‘overwhelmingly
took for granted that universal entitlement to health insurance was a given’.62 Even
the Netherlands, with its entrepreneurial traditions and reliance on private insurers,
operates from the baseline of solidarity.63 In contrast, there has been significant
disagreement in the United States whether universal coverage is ‘desirable and
implementable’.64
These baselines derive from different priorities. Although every country gen-
erally aims to provide quality care to everyone for a reasonable price, the US
55 Diderichsen (2000), pp. 931–935; Saltman (1998), pp. 164–178; Callahan and Wasunna
(2006), at pp. 95–96.
56 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at p. 98 (noting that Italy has some of the highest co-payments
in the EU (30%), although nearly half the population does not have to pay them).
57 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at pp. 98–99.
58 Ibid., at p. 99.
59 White (2007), at p. 401. The NHS ‘survived the Thatcher years’, when railroads, airlines, and
other public services were privatized. Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at p. 93.
60 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at p. 94 (noting that market-based reforms in the United
Kingdom have ebbed and flowed with Labour party); Ranade (1998b), pp. 101–118.
61 Jost (2006), at pp. 433–434. Note, however, that like the United States, the Dutch system
relies primarily on private insurers.
62 Marmor (1998), p. 68.
63 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at p. 103; Robinson (1998), pp. 147–162.
64 Marmor (1998), at p. 68.
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health care system places a higher priority on independence and entrepreneurship
than its peers.65 Patients are responsible for themselves. Americans generally trust
private industry and distrust the government to solve problems.66 Unsurprisingly,
our health care system reflects these values.
In contrast, health systems in the EU are generally based on social solidarity,
the belief that citizens are responsible to each other, not just themselves, and that
all citizens should have equal access to care, regardless of their ability to pay.67
There is less distrust of government and less faith that the market can solve all
problems. Indeed, ‘[s]olidarity is fundamentally a rejection of markets as the best
means to distributing health care goods and services’.68 Logically, EU health
systems reflect these values.69
Among Member States, market-based reforms are intended to reduce costs,
increase efficiency, and give patients greater choice—all pragmatic goals. In the
United States, proponents tout the same pragmatic goals, but also cling to market-
based solutions on ideological grounds, seeking to increase the private sector’s
role at the expense of the public sector. Thus, market-based solutions are propelled
in the United States much more by ideological forces.70
Yet, as in the United States, health care systems in the EU (varied as they are)
must determine the extent to which health care is an economic, commercial
endeavor versus a non-economic, public good. Article 168 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that health care is the respon-
sibility of Member States. However, EU law, enunciated through Treaties,
Directives, Regulations, and landmark decisions by the European Court of Justice
(ECJ), prohibits Member States from restricting the free movement of goods,
services, persons, and capital within the internal common market, and bans anti-
competitive or protectionist arrangements.71 Thus, EU law sometimes requires
65 Gawande (2009); Jost (2007), at p. 15 (noting that the US health care system typically scores
high when evaluating creativity and innovation).
66 Jost (2007), at p. 117.
67 Newdick (2008), pp. 844–845 (‘Solidarity animates the European idea of health care to this
day’.)(internal quotations omitted); Callahan and Wasunna describe ‘solidarity’ as ‘a communal
or communitarian moral promise’ rather than a publicly recognized right expressed in more
individualistic terms. Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at pp. 90, 105. Newdick also contrasts
solidarity from ‘a modern rights based approach’. Newdick (2008), at p. 845.
68 Jost (2007), at p. 172.
69 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at p. 87.
70 Ibid., at p. 109.
71 Several articles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prevent Member
States from restricting the free movement of goods (Articles 34–36 TFEU), persons (Articles
45–48 TFEU), services (Articles 56–62 TFEU), and capital (Articles 63–66 TFEU). Two Articles
prohibit anti-competitive arrangements (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU). See Treaty of Lisbon
amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, 13 December 2007, OJ (C 306) 1, 10, 42; see also Gronden, van de (2008),
pp. 705–760.
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Member States to consider whether internal health policy decisions restrict free
movement or are otherwise anti-competitive.
However, as van de Gronden notes:
it is difficult and sometimes nearly impossible to draw a distinction between elements of
the internal market and features connected with the organization and delivery of health
care.72
Although EU law dictates that States shall retain responsibility for managing
services of general interest like health care and social security, judicial opinions
have circumscribed this authority in several high-profile cases by applying free
movement and competition requirements.73 For example, a series of landmark
court rulings by the ECJ has held that Member States have limited authority to
prevent their residents from traveling to other Member States for non-hospital
care, or even to require prior authorization before reimbursing residents for that
care back home.74 These rulings are affecting the basic tradeoffs Member States
make in their health care systems, including decisions regarding hospital capacity,
waiting lists, and even whether to cover new treatments.75
The ECJ is drawing some fine lines here by developing a complicated and
technical set of tests for determining the circumstances under which national
health care systems violate free movement and competition law. Indeed, in the
competition cases, it seems that the more Member States embrace principles of
market competition, rather than solidarity, in their health systems, the less claim
they have that health care is a non-economic activity not subject to the EU’s
competition laws.76 This distinction is the biggest grey area for EU health care
systems,77 reflecting perhaps the broader tensions between economic and social
integration in Europe.
72 Gronden, van de (2008), at p. 707.
73 Ibid.; Hatzopoulos (2008), pp. 761–803; Newdick (2008), at pp. 844-867.
74 ECJ, Case C-158/96 Kohll v. Union des Caisses de Maladie [1998] ECR I-1931; ECJ, Case C-
120/95 Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés [1998] ECR I-1831; Case C-157-99
B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and Peerbooms v. Stichting CZ Groep
Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473; ECJ, Case C-385/99 Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge
Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA, and E.E.M. van Riet v. Onderlinge
Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509; ECJ, Case C-372/04 Watts
v. Bedford Primary Care Trust [2006] ECR I-4325; ECJ, Case C-368/98 Vanbraekel v. Alliance
Nationale des Mutualités Chrétiennes [2001] ECR I-5363.
75 Gronden, van de (2008), at pp. 717, 724–725; Newdick (2008).
76 Gronden, van de (2008), at pp. 740–742, 751 (‘[The ECJ has] scrutinized how much room a
national social security scheme leaves for competition in the implementation of a social security
scheme, and what role the principle of solidarity plays. When a social security scheme is almost
completely based on solidarity, the institution managing the scheme cannot be regarded as an
undertaking [subject to competition law]. In contrast, if the implementation of a social security
scheme is based on a mix of competition and solidarity elements, the institutions concerned do
perform an economic activity and can, as a result, be seen as an undertaking [subject to
competition law]’.); Hatzopoulos (2002), pp. 710–713.
77 Hatzopolous (2008).
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Thus, although health care systems in the United States and EU both rely on
market instruments, these jurisdictions generally proceed from very different
baselines. In Europe, market competition enhances more cohesive, comprehensive
systems; in the United States, it forms the philosophical foundation. Nevertheless,
the United States need not look to Europe or even Canada for examples of effi-
cient, ‘government-run’ health care (the US Veterans Health Administration) has
been hailed as our most successful health care system after major reforms over the
past 10–15 years,78 providing perhaps the most recent domestic example of how
non-market alternatives can outperform market instruments in health care.
15.4 Market-based Instruments and Their Limitations
Over the past few decades, the United States’ health care system has embraced
several market-based techniques to address its problems.79 However, these tools
generally have failed to reduce spending or the number of uninsured.
First, the United States’ health care system was transformed in the 1980 and
1990s by ‘managed competition’, which shifted away from incentives provided by
traditional indemnity insurance and fee-for-service medicine, relying instead on
competition among insurers to incentivize physicians and other providers to make
wiser, more prudent spending decisions.80 Managed care organizations such as
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) began using several tools to lower
spending, including: selective contracting with providers; using primary care
physicians as gatekeepers to limit access to more expensive specialty care; shifting
more financial risks to patients and providers; and using utilization reviews to
verify that treatments were ‘medically necessary’.81
In the 1990s, HMOs, PPOs, and other incarnations gradually supplanted con-
ventional indemnity insurance.82 Evidence suggests that managed competition
actually helped control spending in the United States between 1993 and 1997,
although some argue that this was due more to panic by providers anticipating
managed care reforms than to organizations actually managing care.83 But despite
78 Longman (2007); Jost (2007), at p. 192.
79 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at p. 35 (‘Market thought made a great political leap in the
1980s and 1990s. Health care had become an obvious arena to test its applications and
implications’).
80 Jost (2007), at p. 18; White (2007), at p. 398; Ranade (1998a), pp. 6, 7.
81 White (2007), at p. 402, 403; Ranade (1998a), at pp. 6, 7; Cutler and Keenan (2008), at
p. 469–470.
82 White (2007), at p. 410 (Table 2).
83 Ibid., at pp. 430, 431; Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at pp. 75–77, 206, 207 (managed care
was ‘an economic success and a political failure’, meaning that it successfully suppressed costs,
but was unpopular politically, largely because it constrained patient choice) (quoting Robinson
(2001), p. 2622).
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the decade-long shift toward managed care, spending has continued to rise dra-
matically since 1997.84 Moreover, the managed care ‘revolution’ also failed to
reduce the number of uninsured in the United States, which jumped from 34.7
million in 1990 to 46.3 million in 2008.85 Thus, although managed care introduced
several market-based innovations to the US health care system, these innovations
generally failed to lower spending or reduce the number of uninsured.86 Finally, as
policymakers and academics on both sides of the political spectrum acknowledge,
managed ‘competition’ requires extensive government regulation and aggressive
enforcement of antitrust laws to work.87
The second major market-based trend in US health care system has been
privatization: increasing the private sector’s role in health care and reducing the
government’s.88 In most developed countries, health care is traditionally viewed as
a public good rather than a commodity subject to the vagaries of the market. The
US view differs. Indeed, the long history of American medicine has pointed toward
the ‘coming of the corporation’.89 Proponents of privatization believe that private
businesses can insure patients, run hospitals, and provide health care more effi-
ciently than the public sector.
Many hospitals have transitioned from not-for-profit to for-profit enterprises.90
Physicians have become more entrepreneurial, establishing physician-owned
hospitals, surgery centers, and laboratories, all of which have proliferated in recent
years.91 But rather than reduce spending, privatization and entrepreneurialism
have encouraged a complex web of financial relationships between physicians,
hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, and other income-generating ventures. In
fact, federal and state governments have sewn together a complicated patchwork
of laws that govern financial conflicts of interest by providers, most notably the
federal self-referral and anti-kickback statutes.92
Even Medicare, the federal health insurance program for the elderly and
chronically disabled,93 has become more privatized in recent years, despite evi-
dence that Medicare generally outperforms private insurers.94 Indeed, Medicare
frequently finds itself as ‘the battleground of the market versus government
84 White (2007), at p. 407 (noting that except between 1993 and 1997, managed care reforms
failed to control costs as well as Medicare); Cutler and Keenan (2008), at p. 470.
85 DeNavas-Walt et al. (2009), at p. 59 (Table C-1). The percentage of uninsured went from
13.9% in 1990 to 15.4% in 2008.
86 White (2007), at p. 407, 416.
87 Marmor (1998), at pp. 56, 57.
88 However, as Richard Freeman notes, ‘privatization’ and ‘marketization’ can be distinct
phenomena. Freeman (1998), at p. 190.
89 Starr (1982), pp. 420–449.
90 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at pp. 78, 79.
91 White (2007), at p. 425; Gawande (2009).
92 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b), 1395nn.
93 Cutler and Keenan (2008), at p. 455.
94 White (2007), at p. 432.
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struggle’.95 Since its inception in 1965, Medicare has delegated responsibilities to
private insurers, and Congress has explicitly incorporated private insurers into
Medicare.96 For example, Congress has tried to encourage beneficiaries to receive
their Medicare benefits through a private HMO, first through Medicare Part C, then
through Medicare+Choice, and later Medicare Advantage.97 Although private
HMOs were supposed to control costs better than traditional Medicare’s fee-for-
service model, these efforts have proven to be incredibly expensive and almost
complete failures.98
More recently, when Congress created a new Medicare prescription drug
benefit in 2003, it entrusted private companies to run these new plans, believing
that elderly Medicare beneficiaries would shop online and compare plans that
competed for customers.99 The thinly-veiled goal was ‘to privatize as much of the
drug benefit as possible’.100 Today, Medicare beneficiaries have to choose between
more than 2,400 plans offering a staggering variety of co-payments, drug prices,
and formularies.101 Relying on the private sector has not saved Medicare money:
the prescription drug legislation gave private insurers $46 billion in incentives to
participate, and cost $134 billion over initial estimates.102 Thus, privatization has
also failed to reduce spending.103
Third, free-market advocates have touted consumer-driven health plans
(CDHPs) as a panacea for the US spending crisis. Consumer-driven theorists claim
they can cut spending by requiring patients to spend their own money more wisely
(rather than insurers’), thereby reducing demand for care and eliminating waste.104
CDHPs generally use high deductibles that require patients to pay for most routine
care until the high deductible has been met. For example, a family may have to
spend $5,000 out-of-pocket before the insurance policy begins to cover expenses.
These CDHPs are usually combined with tax-exempt health or medical savings
95 Oberlander (2003); Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at pp. 83–85.
96 Hess (1968), pp. 119–122; Field and Stefanacci (2007), pp. 208–210.
97 Field and Stefanacci (2007), at pp. 208, 209. Note that enrollment among Medicare
beneficiaries was never particularly high, beginning with 8% of beneficiaries in 1995 and peaking
at 16% in 1999-2000 before declining back to 11% in 2003. Callahan and Wasunna (2006),
at p. 84.
98 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at pp. 207, 208; Jost (2007), at p. 201 (noting that the
government has dumped billions subsidizing uncompetitive private Medicare Advantage plans).
99 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108–173, 117 Stat. 2066.
100 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at p. 84.
101 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2009); Schneider and Hall (2009), pp. 25, 26
(citing a Medicare expert struggling to help an elderly parent select a prescription plan).
102 Jost (2006), at p. 439; Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at p. 167.
103 There is also evidence that increased commercialization within Medicaid, the federal-state
insurance system for the poor, is problematic and has failed to reduce spending. See Watson
(2001), p. 53.
104 Jost (2007), at pp. 17, 32; Cutler and Keenan (2008), at pp. 470, 471; Marmor (1998),
at p. 56.
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accounts (HSAs or MSAs).105 The rationale behind consumer-driven health care is
that patients can be turned into consumers if they are forced to pay a larger share of
their own health expenses.106 Today, many insurers offer some form of high-
deductible plan in conjunction with health savings accounts. But again, consumer-
driven health care has failed to reduce spending, and has not proven to be a viable
option for the uninsured.107
Thus, none of these market-based innovations (managed competition, privati-
zation, or consumer-driven health care) has reined in spending or solved the
problem of the uninsured in the United States. But why? Though the answers are
many and complex, the bottom line is that health care is not like other goods and
services.
First, market-based innovations in health care depend heavily on principles of
neoclassical microeconomics that do not work particularly well in health care.108
Taking one example, advocates of consumer-driven health care assume that
patients can and will make rational, utility-maximizing decisions when spending
their own money.109 But research shows that most patients often do not—and
indeed cannot—make perfectly rational decisions about their own health care.
Patients’ rationality is ‘bounded’ rather than perfect.110 Patients’ decisions derive
as much from behavioral, historical, sociological, and psychological factors as
from economic ones.111 Decisions about diagnoses and courses of treatment are
mired in uncertainties.112 Most patients are not capable of evaluating complex
medical information, so they often rely on physicians and other professional
intermediaries to make decisions for them.113
Health care markets are also saddled with information asymmetries between
payers and providers.114 Information about the price and quality of health care
goods and services is scarce.115 Providers have little incentive to produce unbiased
105 Federal laws in 1996 and 1997 encouraged these plans, but it was not until Congress passed
the Medicare Modernization Act in 2003 that they proliferated. See Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Pub. L. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936; Balanced Budget Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105–33, 111 Stat. 251; Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2066.
106 Jost (2007), at pp. 31, 32.
107 For a devastating critique of the consumer-driven movement, see Jost (2007).
108 Jost (2007), at pp. 86–118; Cutler and Keenan (2008), at p. 459.
109 Jost (2007), at pp. 87, 93.
110 Madison (2007), p. 1584; Simon (1979), p. 502.
111 Jost (2007), at p. 31.
112 Ibid., at p. 93; Appleby (1998), p. 39.
113 Schneider (1998), pp. 35–46; Jost (2007), at pp. 98–100; Gawande (2009) (‘Any plan that
relies on the sheep to negotiate with the wolves is doomed to failure’, quoting a doctor).
114 White (2007), at p. 419; Jost (2007), at pp. 97, 98.
115 Jost (2007), at p. 90.
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information and may often have an incentive to conceal it.116 And many segments
of the health care industry still frown upon price advertising.117
Predictably, transaction costs are significant in health care.118 Health insurance
serves a valuable function, but it complicates transactions, particularly because
most Americans purchase it through yet another intermediary: employers.119
Finally, health insurers and providers often enjoy local or regional monopolies,
which leads to anticompetitive behavior.120 For example, there are considerable
concentrations of market power in the pharmaceutical, medical device, hospital,
physician, and insurance markets.121
In summary, neoclassical microeconomics depends on so-called ‘perfect’
markets, but markets are far from perfect in health care.122 Health care simply is
not like other industries.123
Second, several market-based innovations in health care are geared toward
discouraging ‘moral hazard’—the concern that patients with insurance will over-
consume health care precisely because they are insured.124 Indeed, many market
advocates believe moral hazard is the primary problem in health care, and that
insurance ‘is the problem, not the solution’.125 But again, health care is not like
other goods and services. Seeking health care is often ‘time-consuming, incon-
venient, unpleasant, uncomfortable, and sometimes just plain painful’.126 Most
insured patients have better things to do than consume health care.127 Thus,
market-based innovations like consumer-driven health care that seek to limit
patient demand are not likely to rein in spending.
116 Ibid., at p. 90.
117 Ibid., at p. 98.
118 Ibid., at p. 91.
119 As Cutler and Keenan aptly note ‘Employers writing checks to health insurance companies
fear that they will be made to bear the cost; workers are afraid to leave their jobs because health
insurance is tied to work; and everyone is a pink slip away from losing coverage’. Cutler and
Keenan (2008), at p. 459.
120 Jost (2007), at p. 91.
121 Ibid., at pp. 100, 101; White (2007), at p. 415 (‘Overall, a period of market-led
transformation of American medical care resulted in the consolidation of both insurers and
hospital systems …’).
122 Of course, noted health economist Mark Pauly has argued that the correct comparison is not
perfect markets versus perfect government, but imperfect ones. See Pauly (1997), p. 470. See
Rice (2002), for a criticism of how market competition works in health care vis-à-vis government.
123 Jost (2007), at p. 32.
124 Appleby(1998), at p. 39; Gladwell (2005); Jost (2007), at p. xv.
125 Jost (2007), at pp. 34, 35, 70.
126 Ibid., at p. 35; Gladwell (2005).
127 Jost (2007), at p. 35.
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In summary, market-based innovations in health care often underestimate how
different health care is from other industries.128 Market incentives are limited,
particularly demand-side incarnations like consumer-driven health care. Patients
are not ‘consumers’ in any true sense and providers are not true ‘sellers’. The
economics of health care is unconventional, and market-based incentives are often
a crude and imperfect tool for allocating scarce health care resources. As Joseph
White notes, ‘[t]he market did not control costs, increase access, or help rationalize
the American health care system’.129 Indeed, ‘market theory’ has been called an
‘intellectually spent explanatory paradigm’ for health care policy.130
But this has not deterred free-market advocates. When the approaches above
fail, they argue that it is because we have not created perfect enough markets,131 or
that government regulation still impedes the market. Recognizing the limitations
of market-based tools in health care is paramount. But there continues to be a
strong pro-market slant among health economists and policymakers in the United
States.
15.5 The Ideal of Market Competition in United States
Health Reform
Contemporary reform efforts in the United States reveal the extent to which market
ideals retain their vigor. Ironically, market ideals have both driven and obstructed
recent health reform proposals. Both the 1993 Clinton plan and the 2009 Obama
plan took pains to promote competition between insurers and increase patient
choice, but each was heavily criticized by market advocates and others concerned
that the plans would irreversibly amplify the government’s role in health care,
perhaps even leading to ‘socialized medicine’ (a frequently voiced but frequently
misunderstood criticism).132 It is notable that the defeat of the Clinton plan and the
significant resistance encountered by the Obama plan both occurred in otherwise
favorable political settings: both were championed by Democratic lawmakers that
enjoyed a Democratic House, Senate, and Presidency. Yet both plans were bogged
down and heavily influenced by criticisms animated by free-market rhetoric. And
though reasons for the intense resistance to these plans are numerous and complex,
128 Cutler and Keenan note that ‘[e]conomic transactions can happen smoothly or with rough
edges. [Health care] is as rough as it gets’. Cutler and Keenan (2008), at p. 459; Jost (2007), at
p. 189.
129 White (2007), at p. 426.
130 Hunter (2008), at p. 18 (citing Symposium, ‘Rethinking Health Law’, 41 Wake Forest Law
Review (2006), p. 341) (internal quotations omitted).
131 White 2007), at p. 399.
132 Jost (2006), at p. 99 (citing fears over the Clinton plan); Bobinski (2008), at pp. 372, 373.
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many derive from the basic disagreement over the appropriate balance between
markets and the government in health care.
In 1993, the Clinton plan relied heavily on theories of managed competition to
control costs and improve access to insurance133 (though as noted above, fostering
such competition generally requires extensive government regulation).134 The
legislation was long and complex, in part because of the nature of health reform,
but also in part because of ‘the lengths to which it went to appease all possible
political constituencies’, including market advocates.135 Despite these overtures,
opponents won the political debate by seizing on two firmly held beliefs in the
United States: first, that achieving universal coverage will require significant
government expenditures; and second, that the private sector can more efficiently
provide health insurance than the government.136 However, as several American
commentators have noted, ‘international evidence in fact provides striking proof
that the opposite can be true’.137 Thus, despite relying on a framework of managed
competition, the Clinton plan failed spectacularly. In fact, some speculated that its
demise might preclude future reform efforts in the United States.138
Sixteen years later, health reform continued to be both driven and shackled by
the ideal of market competition. In September 2009, President Obama convened a
special joint session of Congress to push for health reform and answer criticisms
that the proposed bills would sacrifice competition for government control. His
speech mentioned ‘competition’ four times, reaching the following crescendo:
My health care proposal has also been attacked by some who oppose health reform as a
‘government takeover’ of the entire health care system. … So let me set the record
straight. My guiding principle is, and always has been, that consumers do better when
there is choice and competition. … Without competition, the price of insurance goes up
and the quality goes down.139
In March 2010, after nearly a year of rancorous debate, President Obama finally
signed into law landmark health reform legislation, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act.140 The Act is more accurately cast as health insurance
reform rather than health system reform, as it generally targets access to health
133 Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993).
134 Skocpol (1995), pp. 66, 69; Jost (2006), p. 580; Marmor (1998), at pp. 60–61.
135 Jost (2006), at p. 609 note 411.
136 Marmor (1998), at p. 67.
137 See, e.g., ibid., at p. 67; Jost (2006).
138 See, e.g., Marmor (1998), at p. 62.
139 President Barack Obama’s Remarks to a Joint Session of Congress (9 September 2009),
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-a-Joint-Session-of-
Congress-on-Health-Care/.
140 H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2010), codified as Public Law 111–148. On 30 March
2010, President Obama also signed the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2010), which makes several amendments to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.
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insurance, rather than reforming how the system organizes or delivers care.141 The
Act includes several major reforms that should significantly expand access to
health insurance in the United States.
First, beginning in 2014, the Act requires uninsured individuals to purchase
health insurance, and those who remain uninsured must pay an additional tax
based on their income. In return, the Act outlaws some of the more controversial
insurance company practices, such as rescinding policies when patients become
sick, imposing lifetime dollar limits on coverage, and denying policies based on
preexisting medical conditions.142
Second, also beginning in 2014, the bill expands eligibility for Medicaid (the
joint federal-state health insurance program for the poor) particularly to uninsured
individuals without dependent children who previously were ineligible despite
meeting income limits.143 The bill thus turns Medicaid into a genuine insurance
program for the poor, as only half of all poor residents are currently eligible under
diverging state eligibility requirements.
Finally, the bill creates state-based health insurance ‘exchanges’ that allow
uninsured individuals to purchase policies that meet minimum coverage require-
ments.144 States will receive money from the federal government to establish these
exchanges, or states can rely on the federal government to establish a multi-state
exchange. Individuals will receive tax credits to pay for insurance premiums, as
well as federal subsidies to pay for cost-sharing obligations such as deductibles
and co-payments. The bill creates separate insurance exchanges for smaller, self-
insured businesses to purchase plans for employees, and these plans are also
subsidized federally.
Together, these reforms are expected to reduce the number of uninsured by 32
million over ten years, leaving roughly 23 million uninsured, ‘about one-third of
whom would be unauthorized immigrants’.145 Thus, the Act would raise the
percentage of ‘legal non-elderly residents’ with insurance coverage from roughly
83 to 94% nationally.
The Act specifically targets competition in the insurance market. One of the
Act’s major features is creating health insurance exchanges in which individuals
and smaller employers can shop among competing plans.146 Realizing that health
141 Although the Act includes provisions that do target the delivery system (e.g., Title III,
Subtitle A, ‘Transforming the Health Care Delivery System’), few believe that the Act will in fact
fundamentally change how health care is delivered in the United States.
142 H.R. 3590, supra note 140, at Title I, Subtitle A, Part A (‘Individual and Group Market
Reforms’).
143 Ibid., at Title II, Subtitle A (‘Improved Access to Medicaid’).
144 Ibid., at Title I, Subtitle D (‘Available Coverage Choices for All Americans’).
145 Letter from Douglas M. Elmendorf, Director, U.S. Congressional Budget Office, to Hon.
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, 20 March 2010, at
http://www.cbo.gov/.
146 H.R. 3590, supra n. 140, at Title I, Subtitle D.
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insurers dominate local markets,147 the Act tries to subject these markets to
regional or even national competition to encourage insurers to offer more generous
benefits for lower prices. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that roughly
24 million residents would purchase individual insurance through the exchanges
by 2019.148
Throughout the legislative process, Republicans and Democrats generally
agreed that more competition in the insurance market would improve the price and
perhaps the quality of insurance. But unsurprisingly, the parties disagreed point-
edly over the precise role the government should play to promote such competi-
tion. Most Democrats argued that a public insurance plan (the so-called ‘public
option’) would force private insurers to offer better plans at better rates; most
Republicans countered that a public plan would ultimately drive private insurers
from the market, inevitably leading to a single payer system. Thus, although both
parties generally agreed in principle that reforms should try to make the insurance
market more competitive, they disagreed significantly about how to do so.
Moreover, many Americans broadly support universal insurance coverage in
theory, but there has never emerged anything close to a public consensus on how
to achieve it.149 A single payer system has never seriously been considered.
As a compromise, the Act replaced the so-called ‘public option’, which gen-
erated fierce debate and threatened to undermine passage of the legislation, with a
series of alternatives. First, the Act creates local, non-profit health care ‘cooper-
atives’ called ‘Consumer-Oriented and Operated Plans’ (CO-OPs) that will offer
insurance.150 The Act would have created a state-based ‘community health
insurance option’, but this provision was later stricken from the bill.151 Finally, the
Act allows the US Office of Personnel Management to contract with health
insurers to offer ‘multi-state’ health plans in each state exchange.152 These three
programs seem designed to offer consumers alternatives to plans offered by private
health insurance companies—without creating anything that could be cast as
‘public option’. Nevertheless, not a single Republican Representative or Senator
voted for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or the Reconciliation Act
that finalized the legislation.
Thus, despite major insurance reforms, the US health care system continues to
tether itself to private health insurance, even though this has not and will not
produce universal coverage. Indeed, some argue that the ideal of market compe-
tition in American health care has ‘siphoned energy away from more appropriate
147 Robinson (2004), pp. 11–24.
148 Letter from Douglas M. Elmendorf, supra note 145, at p. 9.
149 Cutler and Keenan (2008), at p. 472; Blendon et al. (2003), pp. W3-405-09 (noting
that roughly half of Americans surveyed would support single-payer insurance and half would
oppose it).
150 See H.R. 3590, supra n. 140, at § 1322.
151 Ibid., at § 1040 (amending Title I, Subtitle D, § 1323).
152 Ibid., at § 10104 (amending Title I, Subtitle D, § 1334).
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strategies of reform’.153 Ironically, the ideal has both animated and burdened
contemporary health reform efforts.
15.6 Markets in Health Care: Toward a More Perfect Union?
What is the appropriate role for market competition in health care? For the United
States, this is the $2.3 trillion question. Unfortunately, given the nature of health
care, there are no reliable formulae that might guide us. And the experiences of
peer countries, most of which seem to have found a better balance, are so varied
and complex that it is difficult to extract many useful lessons.154 In each system,
the goal is to use the market ‘without doing harm to the moral values of medicine,
most notably the primacy of patient welfare and professional integrity’.155 But in
the United States, another, more basic goal continues to elude us: using the market
not only to control spending, but to increase access to care.
Fortunately, there seems to be relatively broad support to pursue the following
principles, even though there remains significant and possibly even intractable
disagreement over precisely how to implement them.
15.6.1 Insurers Should Compete
Data reveal that there is not much local competition between health insurers in the
United States, and many locales show significant concentrations of market
power.156 Thus, contemporary reform efforts have often placed a high priority on
stimulating competition between insurers, or least removing existing barriers to it.
To some, this means shifting away from employer-based insurance toward a more
flexible individual market, as in the Netherlands.157
Regardless of the tactic, both domestic and international experiences suggest
that creating a competitive insurance market requires significant government
involvement. For example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act would
create state insurance exchanges for those without access to affordable group
insurance.158 The Act relies on significant government oversight to achieve the
dual purposes of controlling costs and expanding access to coverage, recognizing
that a less encumbered insurance market does neither. Regulators can facilitate the
153 Marmor (1998), at p. 69.
154 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at pp. 4, 203.
155 Ibid., at p. 36.
156 American Medical Association (2006); Jost (2007), at pp. 100, 101; White (2007), at p. 415.
157 Ven, van de and Schut (2008).
158 See supra n. 140.
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market by addressing various market failures, for example by requiring risk
pooling, community rating, guaranteed issue, portability, renewability, and limit-
ing rescissions.159 Some of these interventions are more controversial than others,
but none generate as much intense debate as the proposal to provide a public,
government sponsored insurance plan to compete with private insurers.
15.6.2 Providers Should Compete
Data also reveal significant concentrations of market power among health care
providers.160 As with the insurance market, there is no easy solution. But the
following two philosophies might create a more transparent, competitive market.
First, because price advertising is still taboo in much of the health care industry,
many recommend that we require providers to list their prices publicly in order to
facilitate comparison shopping.161 Indeed, encouraging price transparency has
been perhaps the most important and realistic contribution of the consumer-driven
movement.162 Second, a growing contingent calls for financing reforms like ‘pay-
for-performance’ that could better align the incentives of providers with those of
patients and payers by explicitly linking payments to outcomes and quality
benchmarks.163 Providers that improve the health of their patients would receive
higher payments than those who did not, particularly providers with higher
complication or hospital readmissions rates.164 The goal is to use financial
incentives to improve care, encouraging quality over quantity (the bane of fee-for-
service models).165
15.6.3 Competitive Markets Require Accurate, Objective
Information
Competitive health care markets require not only better price information, but also
better information about quality than these markets currently provide. For exam-
ple, in an ideal world, patients and insurers could access a database or website that
159 See, e.g., Arrow, et al. (2009), p. 493; Marmor (1998), at p. 67.
160 Jost (2007), at p. 100.
161 See, e.g., American College of Physicians (2008), at p. 13; Jost (2007), at p. 194.
162 Jost (2007), at p. 85.
163 Cutler and Keenan (2008), at p. 464.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.; Arrow et al. (2009), at p. 493; Gawande (2009) (‘As economists have often pointed out,
we pay doctors for quantity, not quality’).
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would allow them to compare the quality of service providers.166 There is little
disagreement in principle that we need better quality information.167 On the other
hand, recent efforts to generate better information about the quality of health care
goods and procedures have generated controversy. Comparative effectiveness
studies and technology assessments cure at least some information asymmetries by
allowing patients, professionals, and payers to compare goods and services.168 The
market alone does not reliably produce this information,169 which may be why
many countries seem to be embracing these studies.170 In the United States,
comparative effectiveness research has generated controversy, in part because
some believe that it leads to government ‘rationing’,171 despite evidence that
governments rarely use such research to deny coverage for effective technolo-
gies.172 Thus, although the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act would
support comparative effectiveness research, it would not allow the government to
make coverage or reimbursement decisions based on these findings.173
15.6.4 Modest Cost-sharing
Many countries have found that modest cost-sharing can be an effective method of
controlling costs and encouraging more responsible, cost-sensitive consumption of
health care—but only if it does not deny access to care for poorer populations or
deter patients from obtaining necessary care.174 For example, tiered pharmaceu-
tical plans with varying co-payments can encourage patients to use less expensive
generics in appropriate circumstances, and co-payments also encourage more
judicious visits to physician offices and emergency rooms.175 But cost-sharing is
not very effective for services like hospitalization, over which patients exercise
very little control.176 Thus, modest cost-sharing with payments based on income
166 Jost (2007), at p. 200.
167 For a discussion on the limits of this approach, see Schneider and Hall (2009), at pp. 7–65.
168 Arrow et al. (2009), at p. 493. For a critique of technology assessments, see Elhauge (1996),
p. 1525.
169 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at p. 173 (citing studies); Jost (2007), at p. 198 (noting that
political pressure hampers Medicare payment and coverage determinations).
170 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at pp. 172, 173; Dickson et al. (2003), p. 3; European
Network for Health Technology Assessment, at http://www.eunethta.net/.
171 See, e.g., Gottlieb (2009), p. A15.
172 Jost (2007), at p. 185.
173 H.R. 3590, supra n. 140, at § 6301(j).
174 Hall and Schneider (2009), p. 743; American College of Physicians (2008), at pp. 13-14; Jost
(2007), at pp. 130, 131, 191.
175 Jost (2007), at pp. 196, 197.
176 Ibid., at p. 197.
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can encourage patients to consume certain health care goods and services
responsibly.
It is important to keep in mind that not all health care goods and services are
created equal. For example, expensive acute and longer term care can be finan-
cially catastrophic for patients, and it is this type of capricious risk that health
insurance is well designed to handle.177 We should subsidize this type of care for
those who cannot afford it and be wary of market mechanisms, particularly
demand-side incarnations like consumer-driven health care, that promise to reduce
costs here. On the other end of the spectrum, more predictable, low-cost health
care goods and services seem to be more responsive to demand-side incentives, at
least for those with sufficient income.178 Other services that are more susceptible
to moral hazard, such as cosmetic surgery, also seem to respond to cost-sharing
incentives and provider competition.179
There is evidence that supply-side competition works best ‘with the help
of demand-side control imposed by government monopsonistic purchasing clout’,180
reflected in efforts to introduce a public health insurance option to compete
with private insurers.181 The United States uses both supply-side and demand-side
incentives, ‘perhaps the worst of both worlds’ because cost-sharing is not complete
enough to restrain demand, and care is not managed systematically enough to restrain
supply.182 Supply-side limits are much more common in other countries, but demand-
side limits like consumer-driven health care seem to be the device du jour of the
pro-market crowd.183 Nevertheless, there seems to be a growing consensus that
market-based incentives work better on the supply side (where, for example, they can
encourage providers to offer better prices and higher quality care) than on the demand
side (which relies, for example, on patients to make wise spending decisions).184
15.6.5 Retail Care
There has been a proliferation of private retail clinics in the United States that
provide basic care in retail chain pharmacies, supermarkets, and discount stores.185
177 Ibid., at pp. xii, 192, 193.
178 Ibid., at pp. 193–194.
179 Ibid., at pp. xvii, 193.
180 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at p. 209.
181 The legislation passed by the US House of Representatives included such an option. See
Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); Jost (2007), at
p. 195.
182 Cutler and Keenan (2008), at p. 470, 471.
183 Ibid., at p. 471.
184 Saltman and Figueras (1996), p. 20; Schneider and Hall (2009), at pp. 10, 11.
185 Sage (2007), pp. 1233–1334.
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These clinics employ a number of market-based innovations that make them
attractive to the uninsured and under-insured, thus potentially expanding access to
care. For example, retail clinics typically accept cash payments rather than
insurance; openly post prices; have low overhead and maintain expansive hours;
provide basic care for common ailments; employ mid-level practitioners such as
physicians assistants and nurse-practitioners; make use of electronic medical
records and computerized practice guides; and focus on customer service.186 Retail
clinics generally expand access to care and introduce a modicum of competition in
the delivery of care.187 The retail movement has delivered several innovations,
though the government should still cover routine health care for the poorest among
us.188
Together, these market-facilitating philosophies underscore the reality that
competition in health care works best when coupled with relatively strong gov-
ernment regulation to guide it.189 Competitive insurance markets require extensive
government regulation to combat market failures like adverse selection and moral
hazard. Competitive provider markets require robust enforcement of antitrust and
fraud and abuse laws.190 Markets alone do not provide reliable comparative
information about the price or quality of health care goods and services. Indeed,
some argue that for any market-based reforms to successfully improve cost,
quality, and access in the United States, they ‘would have to include such sub-
stantial restrictions on the normal ways of doing business in US markets that it
would be barely recognizable as market-oriented in the American context’.191
White echoes this sentiment, arguing that ‘[e]ffective reform will require
restraining the market, not relying on it’.192 Finally, facilitating competition is not
costless: the ‘transaction costs’ of regulating and promoting competition can often
‘mean that the efficiency gains of competition are used to sustain the system of
competition itself’.193
In short, the logic and goals of markets do not produce the type of health care
system that most Americans want.194 The basic market for health care in the
United States gives providers wide latitude to pursue profits, requires patients and
payers to shop intelligently for health care goods and services, and grants entre-
preneurs broad access to capital.195 But these features ‘do not appear to be helping
186 Ibid., at pp. 1238–1242.
187 Ibid., at p. 1235.
188 Jost (2007), at p. 194.
189 Callahan and Wasunna (2006), at p. 209.
190 Haas-Wilson (2003).
191 White (2007), at p. 399 (internal quotations omitted).
192 Ibid., at p. 436.
193 Freeman (1998a), p. 400.
194 White (2007), at pp. 395, 434.
195 Ibid., at p. 434.
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the health care system attain its goals’.196 The United States’ health care market
does provide a wide array of choices and does offer sophisticated, high-end
care.197 But it does so at a significant cost. Our system encourages innovation, but
the immense innovation over the last twenty years has not markedly improved our
system.198
Markets alone will not adequately insure the elderly or sick among us. Uni-
versal coverage requires some people to subsidize others, and no country provides
universal coverage without the government compelling such subsidies.199 Equity is
not what markets provide, and markets have failed to provide a more equitable and
efficient system.200
15.7 Conclusion
The United States remains an international outlier in health care, both functionally
and philosophically. Though EU Member States also rely on market instruments in
health care, and similarly struggle to locate the appropriate boundaries, these
nations generally implement market-based policies from a baseline of universal
coverage that the United States does not enjoy, even after major health insurance
reform. The ideal of market competition in the US health care system persists, but
continues to elude us, as demonstrated by contemporary reform efforts. The evi-
dence suggests that market theories and policy instruments have yet to produce the
health care system most Americans want. Recognizing the limits to market
competition in health care—including learning to distinguish where it is helpful
from where it is not—will be necessary to further improve our system.
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